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Summary
With the appearance of “wellbeing stagnation”, the Chinese government has gradually
realized the negative impact of increasingly severe environmental problem on people’s
wellbeing, and has then has formulated a series of environmental policies. Based on the
balanced panel data from2014 to 2018 from China Family Panel Studies (CFPS)and by
means of the fixed effects model, we analyze the relationships between heterogeneous
environmental regulations (ERs) and subjective wellbeing (SWB) from the perspective of
diligent governance. Our results show that command-control environmental regulation (CER)
and voluntary environmental regulation (VER)have positive effects on SWB, but there existthe
heterogeneity effects in the links between ERs and SWB. Vulnerable populations, including
those with rural hukou, less educated, have paidmore attention to VER, whereas the view of
other groups is the opposite. Similarly, the people with low incomes or living in economically
underdeveloped areas or western region, are sensitive to VER, while the others only pay
attention to CER.The SWB of those with better health can be enhanced by CER, and the SWB
of those with poor health are unaffected by CER and VER.Further channel analysis illustrates
that CER can improve SWB by increasing people’s evaluation of the government, while VER
cannot. Our results imply that the people would place more weight on environmental
governance as their income rises, and can help the government institute more flexible
environmental policies to improve people’s wellbeing.

Keywords: Subjective wellbeing; environmental regulations; heterogeneity; balanced panel data;
China
JEL Classification: Q53; Q56; O13; R11; P28; H11

Address for correspondence:
ZhongXiang Zhang

Founding Dean and Distinguished University Professor
Ma Yinchu School of Economics
Tianjin University
92 Weijin Road, Tianjin 300072, China
E-mail address: ZhangZX@tju.edu.cn
The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: working.papers@feem.it

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1350

2

Guo and Zhang: Can the diligent governance increase subjective wellbeing? N

Can the diligent governance increase subjective wellbeing?
New evidence from environmental regulations in China
Shu Guoa,b; ZhongXiang Zhanga,b,
a
Ma Yinchu School of Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China
b
China Academy of Energy, Environmental and Industrial Economics, China

Abstract: With the appearance of “wellbeing stagnation”, the Chinese government has gradually
realized the negative impact of increasingly severe environmental problem on people’s wellbeing,
and has then has formulated a series of environmental policies. Based on the balanced panel data
from 2014 to 2018 from China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) and by means of the fixed effects
model, we analyze the relationships between heterogeneous environmental regulations (ERs) and
subjective wellbeing (SWB) from the perspective of diligent governance. Our results show that
command-control environmental regulation (CER) and voluntary environmental regulation (VER)
have positive effects on SWB, but there exist the heterogeneity effects in the links between ERs
and SWB. Vulnerable populations, including those with rural hukou, less educated, have paid
more attention to VER, whereas the view of other groups is the opposite. Similarly, the people
with low incomes or living in economically underdeveloped areas or western region, are sensitive
to VER, while the others only pay attention to CER. The SWB of those with better health can be
enhanced by CER, and the SWB of those with poor health are unaffected by CER and VER.
Further channel analysis illustrates that CER can improve SWB by increasing people’s evaluation
of the government, while VER cannot. Our results imply that the people would place more weight
on environmental governance as their income rises, and can help the government institute more
flexible environmental policies to improve people’s wellbeing.
Keywords: Subjective wellbeing; environmental regulations; heterogeneity; balanced panel data;
China

JEL Classification: Q53; Q56; O13; R11; P28; H11



Corresponding author: ZhongXiang Zhang, Founding Dean and Distinguished University
Professor, Ma Yinchu School of Economics, Tianjin University, 92 Weijin Road, Tianjin 300072,
China. E-mail address: ZhangZX@tju.edu.cn.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2021

3

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1350 [2021]

1. Introduction
Wellbeing is the ultimate pursuit of social development, as well as the highest evaluation of
life quality. With the development of the economy and human civilization, people are increasingly
yearning for a happy life and focus more on the spiritual pursuit. Improving the people’s wellbeing
is the ultimate goal of economic development and the public policy, and has received the attention
of all countries. The United Nations designated March 20 as the International Day of Happiness.
However, as economy is growing, subjective wellbeing (SWB) of Chinese has gone in the
opposite direction (Easterlin et al., 2012). The “World Happiness Report” published by the United
Nations shows that among 156 major countries, China ranks 84th in 2015, and the report points
out that the Chinese in 2015 are less happy than in 1990. On the one hand, China has not taken
into account the people’s wellbeing while developing its economy, leading to “wellbeing
stagnation” (Bartolini and Sarracino, 2014). On the other hand, growing levels of pollution have
made a very profound influence on the daily lives of people. Obviously, environmental pollution
has become an important factor to restrict the improvement of SWB (Levinson, 2012).
With the environmental problem has become increasingly prominent, a large number of
scholars have taken to studying the relation between environmental quality and subjective
wellbeing, which focus mainly on the perspectives of climate conditions and air quality (Rehdanz
et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2017). However, it is generally known that environmental pollution is an
outgrowth of economic development. Compared with the area economically under-developed, the
economically developed area may have greater pressure on environmental governance and poor
environmental quality. In addition, as a public good, the environment cannot be resolved just by
the market, so the government plays a pivotal role in it. The local government needs to maintain
comprehensive development level. While sustaining economic growth, the environmental quality
of each region has unique equilibrium that is determined by industrial structure, economic
development and so on, so there is no comparison between each province. In other words, if the
same environmental quality is achieved by different provinces, their governments have such a
variety of effort levels. At the same time, SWB is a comprehensive index, which is affected by
multiple factors, and environmental quality is only one factor. Thus, it seems not appropriate to
only study the connection between environmental pollution and SWB, which seems to ignore the
2
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difference of economic characteristics between each province. And such research pays so much
attention to the achievements that it ignores the government’s efforts. Although environmental
quality is influenced by other factors in each region, environmental regulations (ERs) are a variety
of public policies set for the environmental problem, and the implementation and enforcement of
measures are more independent. With the increasing negative impact of environmental pollution
on people’s lives and the raising public awareness of environmental preservation, more and more
people have begun to actively join in protecting the environment. ERs can more reflect how
significant the government considers environmental issues to be, and would ease the concerns of
the public for environmental pollution, thereby promoting their satisfaction with government.
Moreover, public policies are designed to better improve people’s wellbeing (Chen and Li, 2012),
and a diligent government may be more popular. Therefore, if people are significantly sensitive to
environmental pollution, will environmental regulations, as a kind of public policies, still have
positive impacts on subjective wellbeing under the established achievements (the current
environment pollutes)? Will different types of environmental regulations have heterogeneous
effects? These questions seem to have been given little attention.
In order to address the above questions, this study divides environmental regulations (ERs)
into command-control environmental regulation (CER) and voluntary environmental regulation
(VER) (Zhu et al., 2021). CER and VER measure the actions and the commitments of the
government in environmental governance respectively. Based on balanced panel data which
matches the data of the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) with provincial macro data, the
impacts of CER and VER on SWB are respectively investigated in detail. Since this study mainly
attaches importance to the efforts in environmental governance rather than the achievements,
considering the possible influence of environmental pollution on SWB, we introduce
environmental pollution as a control variable. And we further discuss the people’s evaluation of
the government, the mechanism behind how ERs influence SWB. In theory, this study provides a
new angle for evaluating the public policy, and future research can investigate the policy from the
perspective of people’s wellbeing. In practice, this paper can help the government to clarify the
present situation of local governance measures in environment, and contribute to improving the
management system. Our conclusions are meaningful for the government to formulate the
3
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optimum environmental regulations to improve subjective wellbeing in accordance with the local
conditions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides literature review and
Section 3 lists empirical design. Section 4 discusses benchmark analysis, including panel fixed
effect results, robustness checks and endogeneity tests, while Section 5 describes advanced
analysis, including heterogeneous effects and channel analysis. The conclusions and policy
implications are shown in Section 6.

2. Literature review
The study of happiness economics has achieved fruitful results in the last 20 years. Happiness
economics originates from the “Easterlin Paradox”, that is, people with higher incomes are more
likely to find wellbeing within a country, but the average wellbeing of a country will not increase
with the growth of per capita GDP. This has aroused extensive discussions, and the relationship
between income and SWB has received more attention. Easterlin (2005) believes that the relation
between income and SWB almost entirely depends on relative income. Due to comparing
mentality, when everyone becomes richer, people will not become much happier, because, on
average, relative income has not changed and perhaps even become more deteriorate, which is
also proved by Clark et al. (2008) from a theoretical perspective. Boyce et al. (2010) propose a
rank-income hypothesis, indicating that it is income rank not income level that affects life
satisfaction. Along with the continuously growing resident income in the future, the income gap
will gradually widen, leading to income inequality. And income inequality will exacerbate the
decline in SWB (Delhey and Dragolov, 2013; Zhang and Churchill, 2020). The environment
seems to have a positive relationship with income inequality (Heerink et al., 2001). Higher-income
families have the ability to obtain more social resources, including those cause pollution, but the
environmental cost needs to be borne by the entire society.
It is certain that economic factor is one of the most important factors affecting SWB (Su et al.,
2021). In addition, the impact of the ecological environment on SWB has been paid more and
more attention (Welsch, 2006; Zhang et al., 2017). Economic development has not only
exacerbated income inequality but also brought environmental pollution. With the increase of
4
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income, the demand for green environment is also rising, and the impact of the environmental
quality on SWB has become more and more valued (MacKerron and Mourato, 2009; Chen et al.,
2013). Levinson (2012) finds that air pollution can significantly make people unhappier, and
calculates that the willingness to pay for a unit of air quality is $459 a year. Ferreira et al. (2013)
detect that reducing SO2 concentrations is likely to enhance life satisfaction in Europe. Zhang et al.
(2017) distinguish SWB into long-term life satisfaction and short-term hedonic happiness, and
point out that air pollution would reduce hedonic happiness, while it has no effect on life
satisfaction. With the deteriorating environment, energy poverty has emerged. Energy poverty has
a negative impact on health and SWB (Zhang et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2021). There is no doubt
that these researches help us deeply understand the reasons for “wellbeing stagnation”, but they
may not discern the nature of the question.
In fact, as an organization that manages social public affairs, the government formulates
social rules and public policies which are the foundation of one country’s economy. The ultimate
goal of the government and its policies is to increase national welfare. Thus, the behaviors of the
government may be an important precondition for increasing SWB (Samanni and Hol⁃mberg，
2010). Studying the external factors affecting SWB has guiding significance for perfecting
policies (Altindag and Xu, 2017). Chen and Li (2012) find that government quality has far more
enhancing effect on residents’ wellbeing than economic growth. Sun and Xiao (2012) examine
two types of social policies that are related to income distribution and social security, concluding
that perceived fairness has an impact on life satisfaction. Gao and Zhai (2017) evaluate the urban
Dibao by studying the SWB of the poor in China. Existing references have proved that the public
policy and environmental pollution have great effects on SWB (Levinson, 2012; Zhang et al.,
2017). Environmental regulations seem to play an irreplaceable role in the relationship between
environmental pollution and SWB, so studying environmental governance would better reveal the
reasons behind them. Few studies have paid attention to the impact of environmental regulations
on people’s daily lives. The satisfaction with the public service of the ecological environment will
increase personal life satisfaction (Zhou et al., 2015). Wang et al. (2021) point out that demanding
city to disclosure its air quality data, as a kind of environmental regulations, could significantly
increase SWB. They only consider the impact of single policy, and the result is incomprehensive.
5
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The pertinent literatures usually have regarded environmental quality as an intermediary variable,
that is, ERs may affect SWB by improving environmental quality. Such study has paid more
attention to the effect of policy implementation and failed to highlight the impact of the
government’s efforts on the public. As analyzed above, the value of environmental quality is
affected by many factors and they are not comparable among various provinces. Therefore, we
calculate the environmental pollution of each province and control it in the model, which better
characterizes the value that the people place on the government’s efforts in environmental
governance. In addition, the related studies have not considered the heterogeneous contacts and
the potential mechanism between ERs and SWB, and not used panel data that can better reveal the
causal relationship between ERs and SWB.
Early literatures used single indicator to measure environmental regulation (Zhang et al.,
2011), such as emission charges and pollution control investment expenditures. Some scholars
also used composite indicator composed of major pollutants to measure environmental regulation
(Shen et al., 2017). However, it fails to distinguish between different types of environmental
regulations, whether single indicator or composite indicator (Bo et al., 2018). In recent years,
more and more scholars have realized the heterogeneity of ERs. Existing literatures that research
on the heterogeneity of ERs mostly divide it into command-control environmental regulation,
voluntary environmental regulation and market-incentive environmental regulation (Chen and
Monahan, 2010; Xie et al., 2017; Zhu et al., 2021). Market-incentive environmental regulation
means that the government manages the environmental problem by regulating the market.
However, we mainly discuss the relationship between the government’s efforts in environment and
personal subjective wellbeing, and regulating the market will affect firm performance, thereby
impacting personal income level, so it is not adopted. We finally choose command-control
environmental regulation (CER) and voluntary environmental regulation (VER) to measure the
actions and the commitments of the government in environmental governance respectively. CER
refers to the government’s compulsory environmental governance actions. This study mainly
refers to the government’s investment actions in environmental governance which belongs to the
public expenditure and reflects the government’s positive governance. Reasonable government
public expenditure can improve social welfare (Hu and Lu, 2012). VER is informal environmental
6
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regulation, which refers to the public spontaneously participate in environmental supervision and
governance. Political participation is one of the important means to improve wellbeing (Stiglitz et
al., 2010).
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, this
research is the first one to focus on investigating the influence of government’s efforts in
environment on the public under the established achievements. Combining ERs with SWB and
controlling environmental pollution, we test the importance of environmental governance from the
perspective of people’s wellbeing. Secondly, this paper distinguishes the heterogeneity of different
environmental regulations, different human groups and different regions, which have important
policy inspirations for environmental governance. Thirdly, this study not only examines the direct
impact of ERs on SWB, but also the potential mechanism behind them. Finally, we enrich the
study of the people’s wellbeing. We take ERs as an example to explore the impact of the public
policy on SWB, and more accurately reveal the relation between the government actions and local
people’s wellbeing.

3. Empirical design
3.1. Sample
The data used in this paper is from China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) which has been
launched by the Chinese Social Science Survey Center of Peking University. The CFPS is a
nationwide large-scale longitudinal social survey, and reflects the changes in the Chinese society,
economy, population, education and health by tracking and collecting data of individuals, families,
and communities. The CFPS started in 2010, and all family members in the baseline survey and
their future children are defined as gene members who will be interviewed every two years as the
permanently tracker. It provides a wealth of information at the individual level and household
level, covering subjective perception, demographics and social activities, among others, so it is
widely used in studying subjective wellbeing (Zhang and Churchill, 2020).
According to statistics of Baidu search engine, the search volume of “smog” in 2013 was 14
times that of 2012. At the same time, people’s environmental awareness has also begun to awaken
(Li et al., 2021). A similar situation prevails in CFPS. The CFPS asks respondents that how would
7

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2021

9

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1350 [2021]

they rate the severity of the environmental problem in China, in the range of 1 (not severe) to 10
(extremely severe). The average value of this question in 2010 and 2012 at the provincial level are
lower than other years. Moreover, only a few cities have released air pollution index (API) before
2013. Since all cities must disclose air pollution information in 2014, and people have begun to be
aware of the seriousness of pollution (Wang et al., 2021). Environmental regulations would be
paid more attention only if people award that they are confronted with environmental crisis.
Therefore, we use the last three waves of the CFPS, balanced panel data from 2014, 2016 and
2018 with a total of 46161 observations.
3.2. Variables
3.2.1 Subjective wellbeing (SWB)
In the CFPS, each family member older than 16 will be answered such a question, “Are you
satisfied with your life?”, and they can choose the score from 1 to 5, where 1 represents very
unsatisfied and 5 represents very satisfied. We employ this question to measure SWB. This
question is usually employed to measure SWB in the previous studies (Appau et al., 2019; Zhang
and Churchill, 2020). In the data that we have selected, the number of people who answered “very
satisfied” is the largest, accounting for 32.20%, followed by “quite satisfied” with 31.11%,
“normal” with 28.35%, and the least “less satisfied” and “very dissatisfied” are 5.68% and 2.66%,
respectively.
3.2.2 Environmental regulations (ERs)
This study mainly explores whether SWB will increase through the government’s efforts in
environmental governance, and we divide ERs into command-control environmental regulation
(CER) and voluntary environmental regulation (VER), representing actions and commitments
respectively.
(1) Command-control environmental regulation (CER)
CER refers to the government’s compulsory pollution control regulations (Tang et al., 2020).
In this study, we mainly discuss the investment in environmental protection which represents the
positive actions of governance. In the existing literature, CER has been measured in many ways,
such as the number of pollution inspections at the industry level (Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003),
investment in the “three simultaneous” projects for environment (Li et al., 2019), and the ratio of
8
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investment in treatment of industrial pollution sources to industrial added value (Zhang et al.,
2011), etc. Based on data availability, we use the proportion of the investment in environmental
governance to GDP as an indicator of CER (Yin et al. 2015). Alternatively, we follow Zhang et al.
(2011) and construct another measure of CER, the proportion of investment in controlling
industrial pollution to industrial added value (CER1), which is used for a robustness test.
(2) Voluntary environmental regulation (VER)
VER refers to the public voluntarily participate in environmental governance, which plays a
role of supervision. As the practical actions, CER evaluates the government investment in
environmental protection. Moreover, sometimes the government actively takes comments from the
public and makes commitments for improvement, which also plays an important role in increasing
popular support. Public participation reflects the public’s awareness of environmental protection
and social responsibility, and thus the public voluntarily assumes the responsibility of improving
environmental quality (Carvalho et al., 2019). Public participation can alleviate the problem of
information asymmetrical between the regulator and the regulated, which is a key problem of
environmental policy. Thus, it can be regard as a kind of environmental regulation (Li et al., 2018),
and can be distinguished as pre-incident and post-incident. One is before pollution problems occur,
the public participates in the formulation of environmental policies, while the other is that the
public complains to the government about the environmental pollution behaviors when the
problem is occurring (Wu et al., 2020). The total number of environmental protection
recommendations by local People’s Congress and CPPCC per 10000 permanent residents (Zhong
et al., 2021) and the total number of telephone and internet environmental complaints per 10000
permanent residents are employed to measure VER and VER1, respectively. And VER1 is used in
the robustness test.
3.2.3 Environmental pollution (EP)
The measurement of environmental pollution in existing references mainly uses a single
pollutant emission, such as the SO2 emission per unit of GDP (Tang et al., 2021), PM10 (Levinson,
2012), water pollution (Pan and Chen, 2021). The environmental matter is caused by multiple
pollutants, so in order to ensure the accuracy of the analysis, we follow Ren et al. (2020) and
construct an environmental pollution index (EP) which is calculated by using the waste water
9
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emission per unit of industrial added value, the SO2 emission per unit of industrial added value,
and the soot (dust) emission per unit of industrial added value. The larger EP, the more serious the
pollution problem, and EP also means the achievement of environmental governance. The detailed
calculation is as follows:
Firstly, we use Eq. (1) to standardize the waste water emission per unit of industrial added
value, the SO2 emission per unit of industrial added value, and the soot (dust) emission per unit of
industrial added value of each province.

Ppj* =

[Ppj - min(Pp )]

(1)

[max(Pp ) - min(Pp )]

*
where Ppj and Ppj are the standardized value and the actual value of the pth pollutant

emission per unit of industrial added value in jth province separately; and max(Pp ) and

min(Pp ) represent the minimum and maximum value of the pth pollutant across all provinces.
Secondly, we compute the weight of each pollutant in each province respectively, as shown in
Eq. (2).

W pj =

Ppj

(2)

Pp

where Pp is the average value of the pth pollutant across all provinces.
Finally, EP of jth province could be defined by:

EPj =

1 3
 Wpj Ppj*
3 p=1

(3)

3.2.4 Other control variables
Based on correlative references (Churchill et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2021), other control
variables we choose can be separated into three categories. The first category is individual-level
variables, including age, gender, objective health, marriage, education and hukou. The second
category is household-level variables, including household income per capita (fincome), household
expense per capita (fexpense) and whether have children younger than 7 at home (child). The third
category is province-level variables which reflect regional economy development, including per
capita gross domestic product (lnGDP) and industrial structure (second).
10
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The descriptive statistics of all variables are given in Table 1. Among them, the
province-level variables are lagging one year. All macro data in this paper are from China
Statistical Yearbook and the China Environmental Statistics Yearbook, and all micro data in this
paper are from the CFPS.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable

Definition

Mean

SD

Level of life satisfaction (very dissatisfied = 1, very
satisfied = 5)

3.845

1.024

CER

The proportion of the investment in environmental
governance in GDP

1.249

0.569

CER1

The proportion of investment in controlling
industrial pollution in industrial added value

3.111

2.014

VER

The total number of environmental protection
recommendations by local People’s Congress and
CPPCC per 10000 permanent residents

0.119

0.0378

VER1

The total number of telephone and internet
environmental complaints per 10000 permanent
residents

7.478

7.201

The proportion of central transfer payment in
total local fiscal revenue

1.099

0.761

See in Eq. (1) - Eq. (3)

0.330

0.413

lnGDP

Per capita gross domestic product (ln)

10.75

0.413

Second

The value-added of secondary industry/GDP

0.443

0.0679

Hukou

Urban hukou=0, rural hukou =1

0.719

0.449

Gender

Male=1

0.507

0.500

Age (in years)

50.18

13.91

Education

Illiteracy=1, primary school=2, middle school=3,
high school=4, university=5, postgraduate=6

2.539

1.244

Marriage

Have a spouse=1

0.890

0.313

Have children younger than 7 at home=1

0.314

0.464

Objective health

Have had any chronic disease=0,
Have not had any chronic disease=1

0.810

0.392

Subjective health

A five-point scale
(poor health=1, excellent health=5)

2.907

1.217

The evaluation of the government
(worse than before=1, good achievement=5)

0.507

0.500

Subjective wellbeing
(SWB)
Command-control
environmental
regulation

Voluntary
environmental
regulation

Fiscal Freedom (fifr)
Environmental pollution (EP)

Age

Child

Govern

11
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Subjective personal income level
(poorly income=1, high income=5)

2.658

1.040

Fexpense

Household income per capita (ln)

9.419

0.911

Fincome

Household expense per capita (ln)

9.385

1.089

Income_level

3.3. Methodology
The fixed effect model is built for empirical analysis, which is shown in Eq. (4).

SWBijt   0  1 ERnjt   2 X it  3 Z jt  t  i   ijt

(4)

where SWBijt is the subjective score of life satisfaction of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ respondent living in the

jth province in the tth year; ERnjt denotes the nth kind of ERs that are command-control
environmental regulation and voluntary environmental regulation individually, and CER and
VER are used in baseline regression, which would be replaced by CER1 and VER1 respectively
in the following analysis for robustness. X it represents a series of individual-level and
household-level control variables, including age, gender, objective health, marriage, education,
hukou, fincome, fexpense and child. By studying the relevant literature, this model also includes a
set of province-level control variables ( Z jt ) which consist of lnGDP and second. We also control
the unobservable individual fixed effect ( i ) and time fixed effect ( t ). Considering that family
members have many similarities in genetic genes, lifestyle, and living environment, their SWB
may appear autocorrelation, so we use household-level clustering robust standard errors (Wang
and Luo, 2020).

4. Benchmark analysis
4.1. Panel fixed effect results
We present the fixed effect results in Table 2. In Columns (1) and (2), we only introduce CER
and VER, respectively. The coefficients of CER and VER are both significantly positive at the 10%
level. In Columns (3) and (4), we add individual-level and household-level control variables. And
the coefficients remain highly significant and positive. In Columns (5) and (6), we further control
province-level variables. Compared with Columns (3) and (4), the coefficients of CER and VER
12
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becomes larger, and they are also statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that people
believe actions and commitments of the government under the established achievements
(environmental pollution). Under the same conditions, the more industrious governance can
improve the people’s wellbeing. Such results show that ERs can improve SWB, whether
government investment governance or public participation. After controlling a series of macro and
micro variables, ERs still significantly enhance SWB, indicating that the government’s efforts can
be seen and recognized by the public.
In Columns (5), the coefficient of CER is 0.035, significant at the 5% level, which represents
that 1% increase in the investment in environmental governance per GDP can raise a 0.035 unit in
SWB on a 1-5 point scale. For government investment, the public can see the real actions of the
government for improving environmental quality. The government is willing to spend the limited
fiscal expenditures on the environment, indicating that it attaches great importance to the
environmental problem. In addition to, this behavior will increase the public’s evaluation of the
government, thereby enhancing SWB. In Columns (6), the coefficient of VER is 0.507, significant
at the 5% level, which implies that 1% increase in the total number of environmental protection
recommendations by local People’ Congress and CPPCC per 10000 permanent residents can raise
a 0.507 unit in SWB on a 1-5 point scale. For public participation, the public can participate in
policy formulation and make proposals. Although the government has not yet turn commitments
into real actions, those behaviors reflect its determination to improve environmental quality. At the
same time, the public’s sense of participation will also increase their confidence in the
improvement of environmental quality, thereby increasing the expectation for a better life in the
future.
Besides, objective health, marriage, fexpense and fincome have significantly positive effects
on SWB, which are consistent with some existing literatures (Jiang et al., 2012; Knight and
Gunatilaka, 2010; Zhang and Churchill, 2020). Furthermore, urban hukou leads to higher SWB
than rural hukou. Whether have children younger than 7 at home (child) can also influence SWB:
children are more sensitive to environmental pollution, so the family members have higher
demands for clean environment, and they worry about the health of their own children, thereby
leading to lower SWB. However, GDP per capita (lnGDP) has a negative impact on SWB which
13
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is consistent with the finding of Bartolini and Sarracino (2014), and their results prove “Easterlin
Paradox”: economic growth is not certain to higher wellbeing. The Relative Income Theory gives
us a good explanation for this phenomenon. This theory believes that people are always
accustomed to comparing with others, and the “bandwagon effect” makes their own SWB change
in the opposite direction as the income level of others increases. Especially when a country’s
economy is developing rapidly, the increasing absolute income may be accompanied by a
widening income gap. In addition, gender, age, education and EP do not have significant effect on
SWB.

Table 2 Baseline results
Dependent Variable: SWB
CER

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.025*
(1.73)

VER

(4)

0.025*
(1.74)
0.394*
(1.68)

Hukou
Gender
Age
Objective health

(5)

(6)

0.035**
(2.15)

-0.095***
(-2.59)
-0.302
(-1.24)
-0.019
(-1.34)
0.040***
(2.64)

0.419*
(1.79)
-0.094***
(-2.58)
-0.304
(-1.25)
-0.019
(-1.33)
0.039***
(2.64)

-0.094***
(-2.59)
-0.295
(-1.24)
-0.019
(-1.35)
0.040***
(2.66)

0.507**
(2.00)
-0.094***
(-2.58)
-0.299
(-1.26)
-0.019
(-1.34)
0.040***
(2.65)

0.024
(0.49)
0.009
(0.13)
-0.063
(-0.72)
-0.174*
(-1.73)
-0.158
(-0.56)
0.149***
(3.68)
-0.043**
(-2.51)
0.016*

0.024
(0.49)
0.011
(0.16)
-0.062
(-0.71)
-0.173*
(-1.72)
-0.164
(-0.58)
0.151***
(3.71)
-0.044**
(-2.54)
0.016*

0.024
(0.49)
0.005
(0.07)
-0.067
(-0.76)
-0.173*
(-1.73)
-0.156
(-0.56)
0.151***
(3.72)
-0.042**
(-2.43)
0.016*

0.024
(0.49)
0.007
(0.11)
-0.065
(-0.74)
-0.172*
(-1.72)
-0.164
(-0.58)
0.152***
(3.75)
-0.043**
(-2.49)
0.016*

Education
primary
middle school
high school
university
graduate
Marriage
Child
Fexpense
14
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Fincome

(1.87)
0.018**
(2.56)

(1.88)
0.018**
(2.56)

4.467***
(6.44)
YES
YES
0.066
46,161

4.450***
(6.41)
YES
YES
0.066
46,161

EP
lnGDP
Second
Constant
Individual FE
Year FE
R-squared
Observations

3.788***
(169.21)
YES
YES
0.064
46,161

3.781***
(139.87)
YES
YES
0.064
46,161

(1.88)
0.019***
(2.68)
-0.003
(-0.09)
-0.351***
(-4.21)
0.613
(1.51)
7.874***
(7.41)
YES
YES
0.066
46,161

(1.89)
0.019***
(2.66)
0.004
(0.09)
-0.347***
(-4.18)
0.833**
(2.01)
7.715***
(7.26)
YES
YES
0.066
46,161

Notes: *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors
are clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.

4.2. Robustness test
In order to strengthen the scientific rigor of this study, we conduct robustness tests in the
following ways: Firstly, we replace the measurements of ERs and income for robustness test;
Secondly, we use Order Logit and Order Probit models to replace the fixed effect model; Thirdly,
we winsorize the continuous variables to control the influence of extreme values on the results;
Lastly, considering the province-level missing variables, we add province fixed effect to the
model.
4.2.1 Alternative measures
The environmental regulation has been done by different measures, and taking only one of
these measures may cause deviation. Therefore, we verify the robustness of the results by
alternative measures of CER and VER. We refer to Zhang et al. (2011) and Zheng and Shi (2017),
and adopt the proportion of investment in controlling industrial pollution to industrial added value
and the total number of telephone and internet environmental complaints per 10000 permanent
residents to measure ERs and they are named CER1 and VER1 respectively. The results shown in
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 suggest that our conclusions are robust, that is, after controlling the
achievement of government governance, the government’s governance actions and determinations
can still increase SWB.
15
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Moreover, the income level has a great influence on the living standard. In the benchmark
regression of this study, household income per capita (fincome) is used to measure the income
level. However, fincome ignores fixed assets and regional differences which can reflect the
relative income level (Fairbrother, 2013). In CFPS, one question is asked: “How do you compare
your income to local residents?” in the range of 1 (poorly income) to 5 (high income). We employ
this question to measure subjective personal income level (income_level) that images relative
income level. Therefore, we use income_level to do robustness analysis. The results are shown in
the last two columns of Table 3, implying that subjective personal income level (income_level) can
still significantly and positively affect SWB, which also proves the robustness of our results.

Table 3 Robustness to different measures of ERs and income
Dependent Variable:
SWB

(1)

(2)

Alternative measures of ERs

(3)

Alternative measure of income

CER

0.033**
(2.08)

VER
CER1

0.522**
(2.07)
0.010**
(2.55)

VER1
Fincome

0.019***
(2.66)

0.003*
(1.94)
0.019***
(2.64)

Income_level
Control Variables
Individual FE
Year FE
R-squared
Observations

(4)

YES
YES
YES
0.066
46,161

YES
YES
YES
0.066
46,161

0.177***
(27.80)
YES
YES
YES
0.096
46,161

0.177***
(27.81)
YES
YES
YES
0.096
46,161

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.

4.2.2 Different models
In the benchmark analysis, we treat SWB as a continuous variable. However, SWB can also be
regarded as an ordered discrete variable. In the circumstances, Ordered Logit model and Ordered
Probit model equally apply to this study (Wooldridge, 2010). Therefore, we construct an Ordered
16
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Logit model and an Ordered Probit model to check on our results, as shown in Table 4. Columns
(1) and (2) present the results of the Ordered Logit model, and Columns (3) and (4) present the
results of the Ordered Probit model. The regression results of each model have little difference
under large sample, indicating that whether SWB is regarded as a continuous variable or a discrete
variable, CER and VER still have a positive effect on SWB.

Table 4 Robustness to different models
Dependent Variable:
SWB
CER

(1)

(2)

Ordered Logit

Ordered Logit

(3)

Ordered Probit Ordered Probit

0.070**
(2.28)

VER
Control Variables
Province FE
Year FE
Pseudo R2
Observations

YES
YES
YES
0.026
46,161

(4)

0.047***
(2.59)
1.037**
(2.27)
YES
YES
YES
0.026
46,161

YES
YES
YES
0.026
46,161

0.630**
(2.28)
YES
YES
YES
0.026
46,161

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.

4.2.3 Different specifications
First, in order to reduce the influence of extreme values on the research conclusions, we
winsorize the main continuous variables by 5% to further proof the robustness of the previous
conclusions. As shown in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, after the continuous variable is treated
with winsorization on the 5% quantile, the results of the two kinds of environmental regulations
are also consistent with the previous regression. CER and VER have a stable enhancing effect on
SWB, which represent the benchmark is not a spurious regression affected by outliers. These
results further display that the public not only values the achievements, but also would be moved
by the government’s actions and commitments.
Second, the baseline regression in this study only controls the time fixed effect and the
individual fixed effect. Although most respondents did not change provinces, this possibility does
exist. Therefore, if the province fixed effect is not added, the important province-level variables
that do not change with time may be omitted, which will make the estimation results biased and
17
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inconsistent (Shi and Li, 2020). In order to avoid this problem, we further add the province fixed
effect, whilst preserving the time fixed effect and the individual fixed effect. The reexamination
results are shown in the last two columns of Table 5, we can find that compared with the baseline
regression, the coefficients of CER and VER are insignificant differences.

Table 5 Robustness to different specifications
Dependent Variable:
SWB
CER

(1)

(2)
Winsorization

0.035**
(2.15)

VER
Control Variables
Individual FE
Year FE
Province FE
R-squared
Observations

YES
YES
YES
NO
0.066
46,161

(3)

(4)

Add province FE
0.041**
(2.30)

0.509**
(2.01)
YES
YES
YES
NO
0.066
46,161

YES
YES
YES
YES
0.066
46,161

0.729**
(2.17)
YES
YES
YES
YES
0.066
46,161

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.

4.3. Dealing with endogeneity
This study controls individual fixed effect, time fixed effect, and a series of macro and micro
variables in the baseline regression, and adds province fixed effect to the robustness test, which
largely avoid the problem of missing variables. However, the factors that affect SWB at the
provincial level are more complicated, and it is difficult to fully add them in the model, so there
may be other omitted variables. This paper introduces two stage-least-squares (2SLS) to address
endogenous problems. Referring to Wang et al. (2012), we use fiscal freedom (fifr) to construct
instrument variable, and we also use the proportion of central transfer payment to total local fiscal
revenue to measure it. The fiscal decentralization system under political promotion and economic
incentive has stimulated keen competition among local governments. In order to attract investment,
local governments try to relax the environmental regulations (Silva and Caplan, 1997), because
the promotion of local officials is inextricably linked to the economic development. Therefore, the
province with higher fiscal freedom will spend more fiscal expenditure on economic development
instead of environmental governance. In other words, the higher fiscal freedom, the relaxer
18
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environmental regulations, that is, the government that has higher fiscal freedom make the less
effort in environment, which meets the correlation assumption. Moreover, we employ one-period
lagged fiscal freedom. The current residents’ SWB has no effect on the previous local fiscal
revenue, which can satisfy the exogeneity assumption.
The IV results are reported in Table 6. Columns (1) and (3) show the results of first stage, and
we find a negative relationship between fiscal freedom and ERs, which is consistent with our
analysis. The F-statistics of first stage are both greater than 10, meaning that there are no weak
instruments issues. Columns (2) and (4) show the results of second stage, after using instrumental
variable, fiscal freedom, CER and VER both can improve SWB, and the coefficients are
significant at the 10% level. The above results proved the robustness of our conclusions.

Table 6 IV results
Dependent Variable:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

CER

SWB

VER

SWB

CER

0.477*
(1.73)

VER
fifr
Control Variables
Individual FE
Year FE
F-statistic of first stage
R-squared
Observations

2.090*
(1.77)
-0.197***
(-8.37)
YES
YES
YES
70.07
0.420
46,125

YES
YES
YES
0.072
46,125

-0.045***
(-31.28)
YES
YES
YES
978.13
0.277
46,125

YES
YES
YES
0.097
46,125

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.

5. Further analysis of heterogeneous effects and channel
5.1. Heterogeneous effects
5.1.1 Heterogeneity tests based on individual characteristics
Considering that the subjective wellbeing has individual differences, we explore the
differences between different groups based on individual characteristics. To some degree, hukou
depends on a person’s growing environment which has a great influence on subjective cognizance
19
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in China. The strict hukou system has restricted the free movement of the workforce and has led to
unequal treatment. A person with an urban hukou can enjoy more social resources, including
social welfare, insurance system, and children’s education. Those with a rural hukou come to a
city only as migrant workers. At the same time, most measures for cleaning environment would
reduce the employment opportunities of migrant workers, and the achievements are more
beneficial for local residents living in the city. Table 7 shows that CER has a significant positive
impact on SWB of the people with an urban hukou, while VER can effectively promote SWB of
the people with a rural hukou. There are two reasons. First, CER reflects the actual governance
actions. The government mainly controls urban environmental pollution. Compared with the
people with a rural hukou, those with an urban hukou have more chances to see the governance
processes that contribute to the increasing SWB of the people with an urban hukou. Second, VER
reflects the government’s commitments to environmental governance. Residents with urban hukou
likely have better knowledge, and they generally place more weight on practical actions than on
commitments. Besides, residents with rural hukou have less chances to see actual governance
actions, so they are more likely to trust the commitments.

Table 7 Heterogeneity in ERs on SWB by hukou status
Dependent Variable:
SWB
CER

(1)

(2)
Urban hukou

0.081***
(2.82)

VER
Control Variables
Individual FE
Year FE
R-squared
Observations

YES
YES
YES
0.071
12,962

(3)

(4)
Rural hukou

0.017
(0.85)
-0.141
(-0.27)
YES
YES
YES
0.070
12,962

YES
YES
YES
0.065
33,199

0.775***
(2.63)
YES
YES
YES
0.066
33,199

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.

Since ancient times, the impact of education on subjective preferences has always been a
common phenomenon in various fields. As the saying goes, knowledge changes destiny. The
group with better education has more choices and can obtain more social resources. Similarly,
20
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facing government treatment measures, people who have received more education have richer and
deeper views. We define those who have never graduated from high school as a less educated
group, and those who have graduated from high school as a more educated group. As shown in
Table 8, VER has a positive effect on the SWB of the people with less educated, while CER can
improve the SWB of the people with more educated. The existing literatures have also proved that
the SWB of the people with different education levels is also different (Zhang et al., 2017). The
people with more educated are more care about the achievements, and they prefer to see the
government turn governance action from commitment into reality. The people with less educated
seem to ignore the governance actions, and are more willing to believe in the government’s
ambitious plans.
In summary, vulnerable populations, including those with rural hukou, less educated, are
more willing to believe the commitments of the government without consideration whether the
commitments will turn out to be an empty one. Thus, VER significantly improve their subjective
wellbeing, and CER has no significant effect on them. The people who with urban hukou or more
educated are more sensitive to practical actions. They believe what they see. Therefore, compared
with VER, CER can improve their subjective wellbeing more.

Table 8 Heterogeneity in ERs on SWB by educational levels
Dependent Variable:
SWB
CER

(1)

Less educated (education≤3)
0.018
(0.92)

VER
Control Variables
Individual FE
Year FE
R-squared
Observations

(2)

YES
YES
YES
0.066
36,109

(3)

(4)

More educated (education>3)
0.102***
(3.55)

0.674**
(2.27)
YES
YES
YES
0.066
36,109

YES
YES
YES
0.076
10,052

-0.106
(-0.24)
YES
YES
YES
0.074
10,052

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.

5.1.2 Heterogeneity tests based on family characteristics
According to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, as the economy rises, low-level needs have been
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met, and the people begin to pursue high-level needs. ERs discussed in this study is a high-level
need, so it is necessary to explore whether they have different influence on different economic
level groups. Considering that family interests affect every family member, we define the people
with higher household income per capita as a higher income level group, and others as a lower
income level group. Table 9 reports that CER has a positive effect on the SWB of the higher
income level group, while VER can prove the SWB of the lower income level group. The results
indicate that environmental pollution makes a big difference to people’s lives, especially among
the low-income groups, because they do not have enough money to fight pollution. Therefore, all
groups hope that the government can effectively control environmental issues. However, CER will
offset the government’s expenditure on other welfare policies. The people with bad economic
foundations also hope that environmental issues can be alleviated, so they are willing to trust the
government’s commitment to environmental governance, that is, VER. Whereas they mainly
pursuit basic needs, for them, the benefits of economic development have offset the damage
caused by environmental pollution, so CER has not improved their quality of life. For the group
with better economic foundations, their income level is higher than the average level, and the
social resources they obtain are more abundant. Similarly, they can also get more benefits from
environment improvement. Doing is better than saying, and they seem to worry that what the
government says is better than what it does. So compared with VER, the group with better
economic foundations are more trust CER.

Table 9 Heterogeneity in ERs on SWB by household income levels
Dependent Variable:
SWB

(1)

(2)

Lower income level (0-50%)

CER

0.014
(0.56)

VER
Control Variables
Individual FE
Year FE
R-squared
Observations

YES
YES
YES
0.080
23,592

(3)

(4)

Higher income level (50%-100%)
0.067***
(2.68)

1.091**
(2.12)
YES
YES
YES
0.080
23,592

YES
YES
YES
0.064
22,569

0.014
(0.04)
YES
YES
YES
0.063
22,569

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.
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5.1.3 Heterogeneity tests based on regional characteristics
China is the third largest country in the world, and its territory spans many latitudes and
longitudes. The customs and natural resources of various regions in China are different. There are
many gaps in economic development and environmental quality between various regions, and the
local government has policy implementation freedom to a certain degree. Thus, there are some
differences between the concrete measures in the practice of ERs in various regions. Tables 10-12
present the impact of ERs on SWB by regional economic development, geographical location and
regional greening rate cohort, respectively.
The results reported in Table 10 and Table 11 show that CER can only promote the SWB of
the people living in economically developed areas or eastern region, while VER significantly
enhance the SWB of the people living in economically undeveloped areas or western region. As
we all know, the economy of the eastern region is superior to that of the western region. Therefore,
the results of the two analyses prove with one another, suggesting the robustness of our
conclusions. A likely explanation for this involves the fact that the governments of economically
undeveloped areas and western region pay more attention to economic development. Although
they have also made commitments to environmental governance, the strained finances can’t afford
to too much environmental expenditure. Therefore, they wish that they can work hard in
environmental governance, but the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak, resulting in CER not
being able to effectively improve SWB. In economically developed areas and eastern region, there
are sufficient funds to support environmental governance, so local residents are more willing to
see actual actions (CER) rather than verbal promises (VER).
In general, the results show that CER will promote the SWB of the people with higher
income level or living in economically developed areas or eastern region, while VER can enhance
the SWB of the people with lower income level or living in economically undeveloped areas or
western region. The people with higher income level or living in economically developed areas
always believe what they see, not just what you say, so they recognize the government’s real
actions more than the commitments. It is widely perceived that improving environmental quality
may be at the sacrifice of delaying economic growth, and it may harm the interests of the lowest
classes, majority of them are low-income earners. The people with lower income level or living in
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economically underdeveloped areas or western region pay more attention to their own income
growth when caring about the environment. Therefore, CER that spends many fiscal expenditures
could not increase their SWB, and they are more willing to trust in VER which embodies their
wish for a better environment but may not influent their income. This conclusion is consistent with
Tian and Yang (2006), which shows that the relation between SWB and income level is inverse “U”
shape, and when income level exceeds the threshold level, non-income factors will play a great
role.

Table 10 Heterogeneity in ERs on SWB by regional economic development
Dependent Variable:
SWB

(1)

(2)

(3)

Economically undeveloped areas

CER

Economically developed areas

0.003
(0.13)

VER
Control Variables
Individual FE
Year FE
R-squared
Observations

YES
YES
YES
0.062
29,492

(4)

0.168***
(2.72)
0.811**
(1.99)
YES
YES
YES
0.062
29,492

-0.202
(-0.57)
YES
YES
YES
0.060
16,669

YES
YES
YES
0.060
16,669

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.

Table 11 Heterogeneity in ERs on SWB by geographical location
Dependent Variable:
SWB
CER

(1)

(2)

(3)

Eastern region

Central region

0.337***
(5.79)

VER
Control Variables
Individual FE
Year FE
R-squared
Observations

YES
YES
YES
0.079
19,698

(4)

0.042
(1.38)
0.268
(0.82)
YES
YES
YES
0.076
19,698

YES
YES
YES
0.053
11,154

(5)

(6)

Western regions
0.041
(0.95)

0.231
(0.14)
YES
YES
YES
0.053
11,154

YES
YES
YES
0.069
15,309

3.328***
(5.48)
YES
YES
YES
0.071
15,309

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.

Furthermore, urban afforestation shows how significantly the government considers the
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environment to a certain extent. Compared with tall buildings, scenic amenity can improve
wellbeing (Ambrey and Fleming, 2011; Du et al., 2021). Therefore, we divide all provinces into
lower greening rate provinces and higher greening rate provinces according to the green space rate
of built district. Table 12 illustrates that both CER and VER are positively link to SWB in higher
greening rate provinces, but have no effect in lower greening rate provinces, verifying main
conclusions of our study. This may be because the provinces with higher greening rate have paid
more attention on the environmental issues, which embodies their determination to clean the
environment. Their usual efforts have also increased the public trust, so that measures for
protecting environment can effectively improve SWB. The provinces with lower greening rate
have some shortages in greening, leading the public not to believe that the government can
seriously solve environmental problems.

Table 12 Heterogeneity in ERs on SWB by regional greening rate
Dependent Variable:
SWB
CER

(1)

(3)

Lower greening rate
-0.008
(-0.30)

VER
Control Variables
Individual FE
Year FE
R-squared
Observations

(2)

YES
YES
YES
0.066
24,536

(4)

Higher greening rate
0.118***
(3.60)

0.850
(1.60)
YES
YES
YES
0.066
24,536

YES
YES
YES
0.075
21,625

0.917***
(2.98)
YES
YES
YES
0.074
21,625

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.

5.1.4 Heterogeneity tests based on interaction terms
As previously discussed, better health condition leads to higher SWB. We test the influences
of ERs on each health condition group by interaction terms between health condition and ERs.
Health condition is distinguished into subjective health and objective health. Subjective health is
measured by a question in CFPS, “how would you rate your health status?” in the range of 1 (poor
health) to 5 (excellent health), and objective health is constructed by a dummy variable, “during
the past six months, have you had any doctor-diagnosed chronic disease?”, which 0 represents that
25

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2021

27

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1350 [2021]

you have had any chronic disease and 1 represents that you have not had any chronic disease.
Columns (1) and (3) in Table 13 show the results of two interaction terms between health
conditions and CER, and both coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level, indicating
that better health conditions foster stronger relationship between CER and SWB. Moreover,
Columns (2) and (4) in Table 13 show the results of two interaction terms between health status
and VER, and both coefficients of two interaction terms are insignificant. Those findings suggest
that CER has different influences on different health condition groups, while VER has no effect.
The discovery points out the better health condition group is more sensitive to the effects of CER
than the worse health condition group, which is consistent with the common sense. The group
with poor health has higher requirements for environmental quality, and they accept the real
achievements more than the lengthy governance process. However, the group with better health
has lower demand for a cleaner environment, so they are more tolerant of environmental
governance. But compared with promising ideas on paper, they are more willing to believe in real
actions.

Table 13 Heterogeneity tests of interaction terms between ERs and health
Dependent Variable:
SWB
CER

(1)

Subjective Health
0.027*
(1.65)

VER
Subjective health
ER × Subjective health

(2)

0.091***
(15.71)
0.014*
(1.68)

Objective Health

0.516**
(2.04)
0.091***
(15.77)
-0.114
(-0.84)

ER × Objective health
YES
YES
YES
0.075
45,186

(4)

0.030*
(1.83)

Objective health

Control Variables
Individual FE
Year FE
R-squared
Observations

(3)

YES
YES
YES
0.075
45,186

0.477*
(1.87)

0.037**
(2.48)
0.041*
(1.67)
YES
YES
YES
0.066
45,186

0.039**
(2.57)
0.538
(1.43)
YES
YES
YES
0.066
45,186

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.
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5.2. Potential channel analysis
This section tries to test potential channel through which ERs influence SWB. We use the
mediating effect model below:

SWBijt   0  1 ERnjt   2 X it  3 Z jt  t  i   ijt
M ijt  b0  b1 ERnjt  b2 X it  b3 Z jt  t  i   ijt
SWBijt  c0  c1 ERnjt  c2 M ijt  c3 X it  c4 Z jt  t  i   ijt

(4)
(5)
(6)

where M ijt is the intermediary variable of the ith respondent living in the jth province in
the tth year. The first step Eq. (4) coincides with the baseline regression in this study, so this
section only shows the regression results of Eq. (5) and Eq. (6).
Greater satisfaction with government public services can promote SWB (Zhou et al., 2015).
Thus, we test whether ERs affect SWB through people’s evaluation of the government (Govern).
Govern is constructed by a question in CFPS, “how would you rate the performance of the
county/district government last year?” on a scale of 1-5, where 1 represents worse than before and
5 represents good achievement. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 14 report that both the influence of
CER on Govern and the effect of Govern on SWB are positively significant at the 1% level. The
coefficient of Govern in Eq. (6) is significant, so Govern acts as a partial mediator between CER
and SWB. And mediating effect accounts for 7.28% of the total effect. This indicates that the
public has paid attention to the government investment in environmental governance. Such
governance actions are generally accompanied by major projects which can be clearly observed by
residents. Visible governance measures can better reflect the government’s attention to
environmental issues and the living environment, and thereby enhance the people’s satisfaction
with government work, which ultimately increasing SWB.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 14 report that VER has no significant impact on Govern, while
there is a positive relationship between Govern and SWB, meaning that Govern doesn’t play a
mediating effect part among the relationship of VER and SWB. VER in this study mainly
represents the government’s commitments, and many doubt whether the commitments can become
true. In addition, the subjective evaluation is a long-term behavior, which could not be changed by
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the current commitment. Therefore, VER cannot promote SWB by enhancing people’s evaluation
of the government.

Table 14 The channel analysis through people’s evaluation of the government
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent Variable:

Govern

SWB

Govern

SWB

CER

0.040**
(2.56)

0.028*
(1.70)
-0.018
(-0.07)

0.412
(1.63)
0.055***
(7.91)
YES
YES
YES
0.070
44,992

VER
Govern
Control Variables
Individual FE
Year FE
R-squared
Observations

YES
YES
YES
0.007
44,992

0.055***
(7.88)
YES
YES
YES
0.070
44,992

YES
YES
YES
0.007
44,992

Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the household-level level; The numbers in parentheses are t-values.

6. Conclusions and implications
This study explores the underlying relationships between environmental regulations (ERs)
and subjective wellbeing (SWB) using the fixed effects model, and separates ERs into
command-control environmental regulation (CER) and voluntary environmental regulation (VER).
We use balanced panel data of the CFPS from 2014, 2016 and 2018, and combine them with
macro data of environmental regulation, environmental pollution and economic development.
Our benchmark analysis shows that, after controlling the environmental pollution, CER and
VER that measure the actions and the commitments respectively, could enhance the SWB. A series
of robustness tests suggest that results remain valid. This implies that in China, the people are not
only focusing on accomplishments of environmental governance, but also value its process.
Our analyses of heterogeneous effects suggest that vulnerable populations, including those
with rural hukou, less educated, have paid more attention to VER, whereas the view of other
groups is the opposite. Similarly, the people, including those with low incomes or living in
economically underdeveloped areas or western region, are sensitive to VER, suggesting that
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environmental governance is a high-level need. For these groups, they are looking forward to a
cleaner and better environment, but hope that the government will give development priority,
because CER will need fiscal support while VER that could be just a series of oral promises may
not need. For others, however, only CER can boost their SWB, because they are richer and pursuit
a higher level of needs, indicating that with the development of economy in China, environmental
governance will become increasingly important. The SWB of those with better health can be
enhanced by CER, and the SWB of those with poor health are unaffected by CER and VER. The
people with poor health prefer to a greener living environment, they concentrate on a clean and
comfortable environment instead of the endeavor of government that they are unsure whether it
will be successful or not.
Our channel analysis indicates that people’s evaluation of the government performs the
mediating function between CER and SWB, whereas it does not play an intermediary role
between VER and SWB. The finding illustrates that, compared with the commitments, the actions
of environmental governance can more change public attitudes towards the government.
Our analyses shed light on some important policy implications. Firstly, with the further
growth in economy, citizens are more sensitive to public policies by comparison with economy
(Altindag and Xu, 2017). In order to realize a better win-win situation for people’s wellbeing and
environment, the Chinese government should continue to strengthen environmental governance.
Secondly, the government’s efforts can be appreciated by the public. The government should
further optimize policy tools and adopt efficient and sustainable governance measures rather than
ones which are eager for instant results. Thirdly, the government should be fully aware of the
heterogeneous impact of different types of environmental regulations on subjective wellbeing, and
establish a more targeted policy mix. Fourthly, the government should understand the impact of
environmental regulations on different groups, and pay more attention to the vulnerable, such as
the less-educated or the poor or those living in economically underdeveloped areas. Finally, the
local government need to adjust multiple environmental regulations based on own circumstances,
and actively guide the public to involve in environmental governance. The government also
should take more advices from the masses and strive to meet commitments, thus building public
trust.
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